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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLS - CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNICAL TERMS - Testatrix' will
executed in I 9 I 6 provided, inter alia, "In case of the death of any of the above
named children, I give • • • his share to his heirs." A son of testatrix died in
I 929, survived only by his widow, complainant here, and his mother. In March
1938, the New York Decedent Estate Law was amended to provide that the
word "heirs" when used in a statute, will or in any other written instrument
prescribing the devolution of property rights, without express or implied declaration to the contrary, should be construed to mean the distributees, including
a surviving spouse.1 Testatrix died in December, 1938. Complainant then
brought this suit to obtain her share of testatrix' estate as an "heir" of the
deceased son. Held, complainant was entitled to take the share her deceased
husband would have taken if living, not through her husband's estate, but under
the will of testatrix. In re Koch's Estate, 282 N. Y. 462, 27 N. E. (2d)
IO (1940).
This case raises the following important problem: when, in a will, technical
terms 2 are employed by the testator to designate a class of devisees or legatees,
the membership of which class is subject to be broadened by subsequent statutory

13 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1939), § 47-c.
E. g., "heirs," "next of kin," or "distributees." For an excellent discussion on
this subject, see Simes, Knouff and Leonard, "The Meaning of 'Heirs' In Wills-A
Suggestion In Legal Method," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 356 (1933). In this note however,
it will be assumed that such words are used in their technical sense.
1

2
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enactment, as of what date will the courts determine who may be members of
the class? This question has been before the courts of some of the states, and
there is much diversity of opinion, three rules being commonly used: membership may be determined by the law as of (a) the date of execution of the will,3
(b) the date of testator's death, 4 or ( c) the date when the question of construction arises. New York has committed itself to the "date of construction"
rule 5 generally, but has made an exception and used the "date of death" rule
when the intervening statutory amendments extended the class of "next of kin"
to include persons not of the blood, i.e., surviving spouses. 6 This exception was
sought to be done away with by the 1938 amendment 7 but some doubts have
been expressed as to whether the legislature succeeded in its purpose. 8 The
court in the principal case indicated that the result reached was dictated by the
1938 amendment, but the peculiar facts of the case suggest the result may be
otherwise explained. 9 For each of the rules suggested, arguments may be made,
3 ln're Crozer's Estate, 257 Pa. 241, IOI A. 801 (1917); Wyeth v. Merchant,
(D. C. Mo. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 785 at 789, note 3; In re Wick's Estate, 120 N. J. Eq.
468, 185 A. 527 (1936).
4 Hayes v. Martz, 173 Ind. 279, 89 N. E. 303, 90 N. E. 309 (1910); Hill v.
Hill, 149 Ga. 741, 102 S. E. 151 (1920); Barber v. Brown, 55 Okla. 34, 154 P.
n56 (1916).
5 Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906); New
York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93, 142 N. E. 431 (1923);
Matter of Canfield's Will, 136 Misc. 551, 241 N. Y. S. 364 (1930), affd. 231 App.
Div. 708, 245 N. Y. S. 778 (1930), a:ffd. 256 N. Y. 6m, 177 N. E. 161 (1931).
6 Matter of Waring's Will, 275 N. Y. 6 at 9, 9 N. E. (2d) 754 (1937). The
testator died in 1907, and the court of appeals held that the devise to "the next of
kin of said John, according to the laws of the State of New York" was intended by
testator to be read in the light of the law existing at his death.
7 See Note of Commission in footnote to 13 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1939), § 47-c.
8 See Matter of Lake, 170 Misc. 840, II N. Y. S. (2d) 145 (1939). The court
here refused to apply the 1938 construction statute in so far as it sought to force the
~'date of construction" rule on the courts. However, the court in its dicta went further
and said the statute was intended to apply only to wills executed subsequent to its enactment, and that the "date of execution" rule should be the applicable rule. Since testator
had died in I 884 in the case, and since there were no statutory changes in membership
of the class named in the will, the same result would have followed in the case
whether the "date of execution" or the "date of death" rule were applied, so the
validity of the court's dicta is dubious.
9 It was clear that in 1916, the date of the execution of the will, a surviving spouse
was not an heir. Platt v. Mickle, 137 N. Y. rn6, 32 N. E. rn70 (1893). This rule
was changed in 1929 however by N. Y. Laws (1929), c. 229, § 6. In this amendment it was provided that it should apply only to estates of people dying after Aug. 31,
1930. N. Y. Laws (1929), c. 229, § 21. Complainant's husband died in 1929 so it
would seem she was not an heir at the date of his death. The principal case however
said "heirs" as used in testatrix' will must be construed to mean the class as determined at the date of construction. However, since at the time of testatrix' death the
surviving widow would be an heir, it would seem to make little difference whether the
"date of death" or "date of construction" rule were used.
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but most courts have failed to realize the logical implications of any given rule.

If the "date of execution" rule be used, the court is almost certain to enforce
the intent of testator at the time when he made the will. Moreover, unless this
rule is followed, the courts will find themselves faced with an interesting
dilemma. If it be assumed that testator did not originally intend a person like
complainant in the principal case to be included within the class to whom the
gift was made, that subsequent to the execution of the will the amendment was
enacted putting complainant within that class, and that testator changed his
mind and desired complainant to be within that class, then the court is really
allowing testator to change the legal effect of his will without complying with
the formal requirements of the statute of wills. On the other hand, if it be
assumed that testator never desired complainant to be a member of the favored
class, then the court is refusing to give effect to the true intent of the testator.
As for the "date of death" rule, it may be said that if any changes are made in
the membership of the class before testator's death and such changes do not
comply with his intent, he still has an opportunity to change his will so that it
will conform to his intent. However, courts following this rule usually fail to
determine whether testator actually had knowledge of the statutory change, or
whether he was still competent to change his will. This rule seems indefensible
logically, for while it admits that the court is not giving effect to the intent of the
testator as of the date of execution, it refusestogothewhole way and give the legislature the right to change the effect of a will at any time by making a statutory
change in the membership of the class. The "date of construction" rule simply
says that the testator is presumed to know that there may be changes in the class
membership by statutory enactment after his death, hence when he uses technical
terms to denote a class, he must intend that the class be determined by the law existing at the date of determination. This rule has one great factor in its favor, simplicity of application. However, as long as the intent of the testator is not contra
honos mores or otherwise illegal, and if the court is seeking to give effect to the
true intent of the testator, it is submitted that the "date of execution" rule is
the best of the three.

